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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CERCLA:
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO
RESPONSE COSTS AND RETROACTIVE
LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) on December 11, 1980 to
establish a comprehensive response and liability mechanism that would
control and clean up hazardous substance releases into the environ-
ment and provide compensation for costs incurred in responding to
these releases.2 Courts are faced with two separate, yet related issues
regarding the retroactive application of CERCLA. The first issue is
whether responsible parties, such as waste generators and transporters,
are liable for response costs incurred before CERCLA's enactment.3
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) (commonly referred to in terms of "one hundred"
numbers, e.g., §§ 101-157 respectively).
2. The sections of CERCLA that are relevant to the control and cleanup of releases
of hazardous substances are §§ 104-107, 111-112, and 131. Section 104 provides for
government response to the release of a hazardous substance. Section 105 directs the
President to revise the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, originally prepared under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321, to effectuate the new responsibilities and powers that CERCLA creates. The
amended National Contingency Plan is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1985).
Under § 106, the President may commence an enforcement action to abate an actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance if there is an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare, or to the environment. Section 107 pro-
vides for liability of certain responsible parties for costs incurred in responding to re-
leases of hazardous substances and for injury to national resources.
Section 131 establishes a 1.6 billion dollar "superfund" to remedy or prevent releases
or threatened releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Section 111 gov-
erns use of the superfund, and § 112 sets forth the procedure for making claims against
the fund.
3. Generally, response costs are those costs incurred by the government in cleaning
up or controlling the release of a hazardous substance. See United States v. Shell Oil
Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1473 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. Morton-Thiokol, Inc., No. 83-4787 (D.N.J. July 2, 1984); United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Wade I). Few courts have actually addressed
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The second issue is whether responsible parties are liable for acts com-
mitted before CERCLA's enactment. Challengers to the retroactive
application of CERCLA argue that the imposition of retroactive liabil-
ity deprives them of property without due process of law.4 This Recent
Development addresses the question of whether CERCLA applies ret-
roactively to response costs and to liability for releases of hazardous
substances. In addition, it examines whether the retroactive applica-
tion of CERCLA violates the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.5
II. RETROACTIVITY
A retroactive statute applies to transactions or activities occurring
prior to the enactment of the statute, and imposes duties or liabilities as
to those past transactions or activities.6 A retroactive application may
create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a disability with
respect to transactions or considerations already past.7 The retroactive
application of a statute is not unconstitutional unless Congress, in en-
acting it, acts in an arbitrary or irrational manner.8 Environmental
the definition or dimension of a response cost. But see Environmental Defense Fund v.
Lamphier, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20843 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that inves-
tigation costs do not amount to response costs), aff'd, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
Response costs are not defined in CERCLA. "Response" is defined as "removal, re-
move, remedy, and remedial action." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). "Remove" and "removal"
are defined as the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the envi-
ronment or actions taken to prevent the release of hazardous substances or to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment. Id.
§ 9601(23). "Remedy" and "remedial action" are defined as actions taken to perma-
nently remedy instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or
threatened release of hazardous substance into the environment. The term includes but
is not limited to actions such as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes
or trenches, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances or contaminated
materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes. Id.
§ 9601(24). Response costs must be necessary and consistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan. Id. § 9601(a)(4)(B). See infra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment states in pertinent part: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "
6. Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H.
1814) (No. 13,156); see Note, Generator Liability Under Superfund for Clean-up of
Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (1982).
7. 22 F. Cas. at 767.
8. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). The fact that a
statute has retroactive application and may upset settled expectations does not necessar-
ily make it unconstitutional. This is so even if the effect of the legislation is to impose a
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statutes like CERCLA that regulate and adjust the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life are accorded a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality.9 It is clear from the legislative history and the nature of
CERCLA that Congress intended to have the chemical industry, past
and present, pay for the costs of cleaning up inactive waste sites.10
III. CERCLA AND RETROACTIVE RECOVERY
OF RESPONSE COSTS
Several federal district courts have addressed the issue of retroactive
recovery of response costs under CERCLA. n Most of these courts
decided that response costs incurred prior to December 11, 1980, are
not recoverable. 12 In United States v. Shell Oil Co.,13 however, a federal
new duty or liability for past acts. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
The Turner court implied that in the area of economic regulation, legislation that
operates retroactively does not violate due process if it is rationally related to a valid
congressional purpose. 428 U.S. at 16-20.
The court in United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753 (D.S.C. 1984), held that the relationship between congressional
goals and the means chosen to implement them under CERCLA were rational. But see
United States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (legislation is
presumed to apply prospectively and it is the plaintiff's burden of proof to show that the
statute is to be given retroactive effect).
9. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84
(1978).
10. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980) (the objective of CERCLA is to
spread the cost of hazardous waste cleanup among those responsible for the damage).
The goals of CERCLA are twofold: (1) cleaning up hazardous waste sites; and (2) hold-
ing the responsible parties liable for the cost of cleanup.
There are several different methods that the EPA can utilize to ensure that a cleanup
takes place. One option is to use superfund money to clean the site, and then institute a
cost recovery action against the responsible party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(4). See also Ami-
noil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 73 (C.D. Calif. 1984). Due to the number of sites
in need of cleanup and the limited amount of available funds, Congress established a
second method for cleaning up hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). In enforcing
CERCLA, the EPA does not rely on § 107, because the estimated cost of cleanup for all
sites would far exceed the federal funding currently available. See Orloff, Superfund
and the Courts, ENVTL. F. 5 (Jan. 1983). Under § 106(a), the EPA can order the re-
sponsible party to clean up the hazardous waste site.
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a
response cost.
12. See United States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. Morton-Thiokol, Inc., No. 83-4787 (D.N.J. July 2, 1984); United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Wade I). See infra note 24 and accompanying
text for discussion of the Wade case.
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district court reached a contrary result. After examining CERCLA's
language and legislative history, the Shell court concluded that retroac-
tive application was consistent with congressional intent. The court
acknowledged the presumption against retroactive application of stat-
utes, 14 but noted that such an interpretation is appropriate if the une-
quivocal import of a statute's terms of the manifest intention of the
legislature so demands.15 The Shell court determined that section 107
neither explicitly provides for recovery of response costs incurred
before CERCLA's enactment nor explicitly limits recovery to costs in-
curred after its enactment.16 As a result of this ambiguity, the court
looked to other CERCLA provisions and the legislative history to de-
termine congressional intent.
After reviewing the legislative history, the Shell court relied on the
traditional rules of statutory interpretation to conclude that CERCLA
applies retroactively. The court reasoned that statutes are passed as a
whole, not in parts, and they advance one general purpose.1 7 The
court stated that the interpretation of any subsidiary part of a statute
should harmonize with its general purpose.18 The House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported that its intent was to
initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mecha-
nism to abate and control abandoned and inactive hazardous waste dis-
posal sites.19 Section 107(a) sets up the categories of persons who are
liable for costs incurred in cleanup. Congress designed the liability
scheme to assure that those responsible for any damage, environmental
13. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1473 (D. Colo. 1985).
14. See 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 41.04
(C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
15. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1475 (citing Union Pacific R.R. v. Laramie Stock
Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
16. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1476.
17. Id. (citing 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 14, § 46.05).
18. Id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125; see also Preamble to CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (CERCLA enacted to provide for the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites).
Though pre-CERCLA law could prevent further pollution from the contemporary
generation and disposal of hazardous wastes, it could not effectively abate the ongoing
environmental deterioration resulting from wastes dumped in the past. Congress en-
acted CERCLA to address those problems. It is by nature retrospective because many
of the human acts that have caused the pollution took place before its enactment. 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1479.
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harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.20
The Shell court concluded that under such a liability scheme, retroac-
tive application of CERCLA was unavoidable.2 1
Moreover, the court noted that section 107(a) is silent on the issue of
retroactive liability for any of the damages recoverable under that sec-
tion.2 2 Sections 107(f) and 111(d),2 3 however, clearly provide specific
time limits on recovery for pre-enactment natural resource damages.
The Shell court reasoned that if Congress intended to limit recovery of
pre-enactment costs, it would have done so explicitly.24 The court de-
termined that the absence of contrary statutory language and Con-
gress' pervasive intent to hold responsible parties liable overrides the
presumption against retroactive application of statutes.25
Although the Shell court held that CERCLA applied retroactively
to response costs, it did not address the due process issue arising from
20. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13 (1980).
21. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2479. Congressional intent of CERCLA was to
impose the cost of cleanup on those responsible rather than on the taxpayers. This
strongly indicates that Congress intended to hold responsible parties liable for pre-en-
actment government response costs. Id.
22. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1479-80.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(d), 9611(d) (1982).
24. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1481. Cf United States v. NEPACCO, 579 F.
Supp. 823, 842 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The NEPACCO court placed great emphasis on the
fact that "there is no clear and affirmative statement in the statute allowing for recovery
of pre-enactment response costs." Id. The court held that all doubts of retroactive
application must be resolved in favor of non-retroactivity. Id. at 843.
In United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court was similarly
troubled by the lack of an explicit congressional statement. Id. at 787. The court inter-
preted this omission as evidence of Congress' intent not to allow recovery of such costs.
The Wade court drew its conclusion after reasoning that the limitation on recovery for
natural resources damage is a limitation based on the time at which the damage oc-
curred, not on the time at which funds are spent to repair the damages. Id. at 786.
Congress was aware of the magnitude of pre-CERCLA costs. See 126 CONG. REC.
S30,969-71 (1980). (remarks of Senator Moynihan concerning cleanup costs of Love
Canal, and remarks of Senator Bradley concerning the cleanup costs of Elizabeth, N.
J.). Moreover, no mention was made of recouping these costs in CERCLA.
The Shell court rejected the Wade court's reasoning and discerned that recovery of
funds spent for response actions is analytically equivalent to recovery for damage to
natural resources. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1482. Accord Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
25. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1482. See also United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (there is a strong presumption against retroactive construction
of statutes, but the presumption is rebutted when it is clear that Congress intended the
statute to be applied retroactively).
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the assessment of those costs. Retroactive imposition of liability upon
responsible parties has not been challenged on due process grounds.
IV. RETROACTIVE LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
AND DUE PROCESS
The federal courts were not confronted with the issue of whether
CERCLA applied retroactively, imposing liability on contributors for
pre-enactment waste activities, until 1983. In Ohio v. Georgeoff#6 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reached
the unprecedented conclusion that CERCLA section 107 imposes ret-
roactive liability on hazardous waste transporters.27
After examining section 107, the Georgeoff court concluded the stat-
utory language was too ambiguous to conclusively decide the retroac-
tivity issue and, therefore, turned to the legislative history.28 Relying
on congressional statements, the court reasoned that section 107(a)
placed retroactive liability on transporters.29 The court stated that the
imposition of retroactive liability was consistent with and necessary to
effectuate congressional intent.3" The court, however, did not address
the constitutional issue of whether retroactive application violates due
process.
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,
Inc. (NEPACCO) 31 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri held that retroactive application of sections 106
and 107 did not violate due process rights under the fifth amendment. 32
The court relied on Georgeoff to determine that CERCLA operates to
26. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
27. The Georgeoff holding is limited to transporters of waste materials. In George-
off, the State of Ohio and the United States Justice Department brought suit against
Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) for the costs related to the cleanup of a dumpsite.
From 1975 to 1976, BFI transported chemical wastes to the dumpsite. BFI asserted
that the liability provisions of CERCLA, including § 107(a), do not impose retroactive
liability for acts of transporters occurring before the enactment of CERCLA.
28. 562 F. Supp. at 1309-11.
29. Id. at 1314. See 126 CONG. Rc. S24,971, S14,973, S14,977, S15,003, S15,007
(1980); 126 CONG. REC. Hi1,793 (1980).
30. 562 F. Supp. at 1313-14.
31. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
32. See supra note 5 for pertinent text of the fifth amendment. In NEPACCO, the
United States sought injunctive relief and reimbursement of all costs it had incurred in
performing remedial and removal actions at a waste disposal site in Missouri. The com-
plaint was filed against the waste generator, the waste disposal operators, and the waste
transporters. 579 F. Supp. at 827. In 1971, NEPACCO had placed waste products in
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assign liability retroactively. In addition to reaffirming the Georgeoff
court's interpretation of congressional intent, the NEPA CCO court de-
termined that sections 104 and 106(a) apply retroactively.33
The NEPA CCO court relied extensively on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co. 34 in its due process analysis of the retroactive application of
sections 106 and 107. The NEPACCO court applied the Turner "ra-
tional basis" test and concluded that CERCLA's imposition of liability
for past acts is rational and satisfies due process. 35 Although the court
utilized the rational basis test, it did not discuss the means-end link
required under that standard.
The substantive due process test,36 applicable to social and economic
drums and buried them in a trench. The hazardous contaminants subsequently leaked
into the ground water below. Id. at 833.
33. Id. at 839. After reviewing CERCLA's legislative history, the court concluded
that Congress intended §§ 104 and 107(a) to apply retroactively. In support of its posi-
tion, the court cited United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1316-17
(D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984), and United States v. Wade, 546 F.
Supp. 785, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Furthermore, the court found that § 106(a) applies
to inactive sites, and that the same persons listed as liability targets under § 107(a)
could be liable under § 106(a). 579 F. Supp. at 839.
34. 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Turner, the Court upheld a statute that imposed liability
on coal industry employers to compensate former employees for disabilities resulting
from black lung disease. The employers argued that the statute violated the due process
clause because it obligated them to compensate employees who had terminated their
employment prior to the effective date of the enactment. Id. at 14-15.
According to the Turner court, a due process challenge to a retroactive statute will be
successful only when the parties complaining of the violation can establish that the
legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. Id. at 18.
35. 579 F. Supp. at 841. The rational basis test requires a rational means to achieve
a legitimate end. Congress intended to have both past and present chemical producers
pay for costs of cleaning up inactive waste sites. Congress considered the imposition of
liability for past disposal practices as a means of spreading the cost of cleanup among
those who created and profited from the waste disposal. 579 F. Supp. at 840-41. See
also United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas.
1753 (D.S.C. 1984).
36. The modem Court has almost completely withdrawn from reviewing state legis-
lative economic regulation for substantive due process violations. Not since 1937 has
the Court struck down an economic regulation on due process grounds. W. LocK-
HART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS 449 (5th ed. 1980). Under the substantive due process test, if the legislative
objective falls within the state's police power (broadly defined to include virtually any
health, safety, or general welfare goal), all the Court requires is that there be a rational
relation between the means chosen and the end sought. See Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (state statute was a rational health measure; the court hypothe-
sized reasons in support of the legislature's actions and determined that those reasons
were rationally related to the health objective).
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legislation since the 1930's, requires that the challenged law have a ra-
tional relation to a legitimate governmental objective.37 The law need
not be logically consistent in every respect with its aims in order to be
constitutional. If an evil is subject to correction and the particular leg-
islative measure is a rational way of correcting it, the law will be up-
held.38 A statute that has no reasonable relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare is considered arbitrary and unreason-
able and, therefore, violates the fifth amendment's due process clause.39
If a regulation is reasonable in relation to its objective, however, and
adopted in the interests of the community, it does not violate substan-
tive due process."
The establishment of a comprehensive response and liability mecha-
nism to control and cleanup releases of hazardous substances into the
environment is clearly a legitimate government goal. CERCLA's im-
plementation of the cleanup mechanism has a substantial relation to
the public health, safety, and general welfare.41 Eliciting compensation
for costs incurred in responding to substance releases and imposing lia-
bility to pay for future cleanups are rational means of achieving CER-
CLA's objective.
The liability provisions of CERCLA satisfy due process because they
are rational means to a legitimate end. Imposing liability on the indus-
tries or persons who have directly benefited from inexpensive, inade-
quate disposal practices, and who have generated the wastes, is entirely
appropriate and fair. It would be less rational and fair to force the
general taxpayer to bear the financial responsibility for remedial meas-
ures. The most rational mechanism for spreading the cost of cleanup is
to tax equally all industrial sectors generating the hazardous sub-
37. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491 (prohibition of eye examinations in retail stores
rationally related to the objective of freeing optometrists from the temptations of com-
mercialism); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529-37 (1934) (price controls of milk
rationally related to the objectives of protecting consumers and industry, and preventing
waste).
38. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88. In other words, the fit between the means and
the ends can be fairly loose and still satisfy substantive due process. See also Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (presumption of
constitutionality unless the legislature acts in an arbitrary or irrational manner).
39. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938) (the rational basis test is used under both the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments' due process clauses).
40. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
41. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. See also supra note 10.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/13
RESPONSE COSTS AND RETROACTIVE LIABILITY
stances and pass the remaining expense (that which cannot be compen-
sated out of the superfund) on to those persons actually responsible.42
The liability provisions in CERCLA are reasonable methods for ef-
fectuating cleanups because Congress attempted to moderate the im-
pact of the liability imposed.43 In examining section 107, it is clear
that Congress provided for limitations on a waste contributor's poten-
tial liability. The strict liability imposed under section 107 is subject to
the defenses of acts of God, acts of war, and certain acts or omissions
of third parties." There are also limitations on liability set forth in
section 107(c). 45 Section 107(e)(1)(2) maintains the waste generators'
right to seek indemnification from the transporter46 in a separate cause
of action.47
V. CONCLUSION
Although the language of CERCLA does not explicitly validate
42. See Administration Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution
and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1980) (statement of Thomas Jorling, Ass't Administrator, Water
and Waste Mgt., EPA). See generally Blaymore, Retroactive Application of Superfund:
Can Old Dogs Be Taught New Tricks, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1985).
43. The fact that CERCLA imposes liability only if the polluter has some connec-
tion with the creation, disposal, or transportation of a hazardous substance (§ 107(a)),
and provides for less than complete liability if the polluter can prove pro rata involve-
ment in a divisible harm (§ 107(e)), demonstrates that the means employed are rational.
See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. By imposing liability on the responsible
party, the legislative means become rationally related to CERCLA's objective.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c). The limitations do not apply when the polluter fails to
cooperate in the cleanup efforts, if knowing violation of certain regulations is the princi-
pal cause of the pollution, or if willful negligence or misconduct occurs.
46. "'[T]ransport' or 'transportation' means the movement of a hazardous sub-
stance by any mode, including pipeline (as defined in the Pipeline Safety Act), and in the
case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by a common
or contract carrier, the term 'transport' or 'transportation' shall include any stoppage in
transit which is temporary, incidental to the transportation movement, and at the ordi-
nary operating convenience of a common or contract carrier, any such stoppage shall be
considered as a continuity of movement and not as the storage of a hazardous sub-
stance." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(26).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)(2). One federal court ruled that users of a hazardous
waste disposal site are jointly and severally liable to the government for reimbursement
of the cleanup expenses unless the defendant can prove that the damage is divisible and
that it is responsible only for part of that damage. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See also Blaymore, supra note 42, at 33-34.
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holding responsible parties liable for acts committed before enactment,
the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to force re-
sponsible parties to pay for their actions.48 This pervasive interest
could logically extend to response costs, and at least one court has so
held.49 Reimbursement for response costs incurred by the government
prior to the enactment of CERCLA and retroactive imposition of lia-
bility satisfies the due process clause. The control and cleanup of re-
leases of hazardous substances into the environment is a legitimate
governmental objective. The liability provisions of CERCLA are a ra-
tional means of attaining that end because it is fair to place liability on
those who benefit from the creation of the hazardous waste.50 In addi-
tion, the liability provisions moderate the impact on those persons
charged,51 and the means employed are not arbitrarily formulated.
William A. Montgomery, Jr.
48. See supra notes 10, 19, 29-30, 33 and accompanying texts.
49. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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